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Abstract 
This paper is about globalisation, the state, and community development and social change in Melanesia. 
The paper draws on the concept of  “the Melanesian way” and also explores the role and influence of the 
Christian churches, kastom, and nongovernment organisations (NGOs) in Melanesian society. It takes the 
experiences of the Solomon Islands as its focus and a case study is made of the North New Georgia 
Sustainable Social Forestry and Rural Development Project – a re-afforestation program established on 
the island of New Georgia in the late 1990s. Through this case study the emergence of a locally-derived 
and locally-based approach to resource development is examined.  
Development and social change in the South Pacific 
Ideas and concepts on the theory of development and social change as it relates to contemporary 
Solomon Islands can be drawn from a rich mix of literature that includes thinking on development theory 
and the developing world, the unique circumstances of the Pacific and Melanesia, and the particular 
political and economic complexion of the Solomons itself. When considered in concert, these different 
points of reference create a sense of a political and economic community that is part of a globalising 
system and that is also embedded in sub-nationally determined movements for development and social 
change. The state is understood to be located between these unfolding possibilities, and challenges to 
traditional state function in this context characterise much of the development conundrum.  
 Current thinking on development is greatly pre-occupied with the ascendancy of globalisation 
within the world system. As Hoogvelt (1997) comments, "The nature, extent and significance of 
globalisation is at the heart of debates about the contemporary world economy and the predicament 
within it of what we used to call the Third World." McMichael (1996, 148) describes this as an era of 
"postdevelomentalism". At this time, the project in which states pursue nationally-managed economic 
growth is in demise in the wake of structural adjustment policies and their long-term implications. As 
McMichael (1996, 150) goes on to state, "Although the globalisation project replaces the development 
project, "development" has not lost its currency. Its frame of reference has simply shifted". Development 
remains a key organising principle in political economy but its deployment is dispersing across all levels 
and sectors in the world system. It is no longer the singular domain of the state.  
 Issues of nation and state in the developing world are relatively longstanding and broadranging. 
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These issues are best understood in a world historic context and are typically linked to colonisation, 
decolonisation, post-colonialism, and the shortfalls of the "development project" (McMichael 1996). In 
this context, Pacific states are largely and exceptionally young, finding their independence only during 
the last 30 years.1 With this youth comes what Otto and Thomas (1997, 1) describe as especially "tenuous 
and inchoate" national cultures. In the specific case of Melanesia, scholars have argued that this 
circumstance circumscribes a weak state existing in conjunction with a strong society (Migdal 1988). The 
development process and associated modernist projects for national unity, stable public policy and 
economic growth appear greatly vexed in the modern state thus described. At the same time, broader 
society including the Christian churches and kastom (traditional ways, systems, and institutions) are 
consistent and longstanding forces for community development and social change.  
 At first blush, the role of Christianity and kastom in Melanesian society might  be described as 
"the Melanesian way".  This contested notion is however often employed in highly rhetorical and 
politicised fashions and Douglas argues that its meaning can only be fully appreciated when the ongoing 
influence of the colonial legacy on Melanesian political life and also the capacity of Melanesian 
communities to address their needs through locally (rather than nationally) based arrangements is 
considered (2000b, 3). In the first instance, the arbitrariness of national boundaries left by colonial 
administrations and their lack of relationship with Melanesian understandings of "nation" has more to do 
with "weak state – strong society" than what might be disparagingly described as a divisive brand of 
nationalism that is "shallow, inauthentic or merely ethnic" (Douglas 2000b, 3). To extend this point a 
little further, researchers have pointed to the virtual non-existence of a national consciousness among 
some local communities in Melanesia (Clark 1997). Based on this, some scholars have even come to 
question seriously the need or viability of the state for the many Melanesian communities possessing 
political and economic integrity and a capacity to engage directly with the world economy (Douglas 
2000b, 3; Otto and Thomas 1997; Thomas 1997). Such discussion may not point to the imminent demise 
of the state, but the essential point remains: the state in Melanesian life is widely accepted as ambiguous. 
 This ambiguity is brought into sharper relief when the strength of broader society and especially 
the centrality of an indigenously expressed Christian faith and Church in Melanesian life are understood. 
Trompf argues that in Melanesian society:  
... religious organisations (whether national or regional) are enmeshed in political activities 
concerning economic development and foreign aid. There is also overlap in spheres of authority – 
secular and religious – as when political leaders are also men of the cloth. In Melanesian nations, 
where education had been almost exclusively in the hands of missionaries until after the Second 
World War, most national leaders owe their education to the Churches, and the indirect influence 
of the Churches on national politics is quite patent ( 1991, 2)  
Likewise, Douglas (2000b, 6) states that for Melanesians, religion is "an intimate lived experience and a 
strategy mobilised pragmatically to achieve private and public ends".  In formal political life, the 
constitution of every Melanesian state except Fiji contains direct reference to the Christian faith (Douglas 
2000b, 5). 
 Along with Christianity, tradition or kastom is a key source of identity and meaning in 
Melanesian societies. Foster (1995, 1) argues that Melanesian elites "have generated a steady discourse of 
custom and tradition that seeks to ground national distinctiveness in definitions of indigenous ancestral 
ways". Along with Christianity, kastom is directly referred to in Melanesian political life through the 
relevant constitutions. As Lawson (1997) and Otto (1997) argue, the power of kastom as a constituent of 
the "Melanesian way" is its situation as an oppositional concept to "the west". But as Otto (1997) notes, 
tradition often encompasses diverse and contradictory notions and Douglas (2000b, 5) for one, is not 
convinced that kastom can afford cohesion: she points instead to the "divisive potential" of this 
"ambivalent symbol for national unity and identity".  
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 The current role of NGOs in development in Melanesian societies is similar to that in many 
developing nations. Where the frame of reference for development has in recent years shifted throughout 
the developing world, McMichael (1996, 150), argues that this is:  
especially at the initiative of proliferating nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) that 
increasingly fill the vacuum as states withdraw, or lose, their capacity to assist subnational groups 
and causes. Thousands of community and regional development projects continue at the local 
level, attempting to improve conditions at these levels or stabilise communities affected one way 
or another by the restructuring of their states. 
Indeed, Schoeffel (1997, 3) finds that some NGOs active in Melanesia "have come to believe that by-
passing government is actually a virtue in itself because of the predatory characteristics of the state". 
NGOs active in these ways in Melanesia are especially prolific in the issue areas of environment – as 
linked to the activities of the logging industry – and gender – relating to women's particular development 
needs and interests.2  
 The discussion of development and social change in Melanesia is meaningless without reference 
to Christianity, kastom, and increasingly the activities of NGOs. These constituents do not however 
represent an alternative to the state in so far as it is manifested in Melanesian life. Otto and Thomas 
through Linnekin claims for example that Pacific intellectuals and historians: "are hesitant to develop the 
anticolonial potential of particularist discourses as this may also threaten the concept of nation, which is 
the converging referent of different genres of historical narratives today. Although the nation may be 
seen as a colonial artifact, it is difficult to imagine a viable political alternative for Pacific Island 
societies" (1997, 12). 
 Given the persistence of the state, scholars have pointed to its essential utility in the Pacific. 
Larmour (1998) explores the real capacity of Pacific states to supply "good governance" – government 
able to develop the nation while limiting the corruption of that process – where there is demonstrated 
strength in civic association. Similarly, Schoeffel (1997) argues convincingly for the fundamental role of 
and necessity for state involvement in development in the Pacific. According to Schoeffel, community 
development projects are typically undertaken by NGOs in response to state failure in the provision of 
basic infrastructure and services. Paradoxically, however, such projects frequently falter because long-
term commitment to and management of project aims cannot be shored up in the absence of state 
participation. Based on this evidence, Schoeffel (1997, 8) concludes: 
Community capacity is vulnerable to all manner of undermining influences, the capacity of the 
churches is highly variable, and NGOs wax and wane on the basis of their funding and 
leadership. This means that there is no alternative, if the current problems of rural development in 
Melanesia are to be addressed, to building the capacity of local government [as an administrative 
level of formal “state” governance] to ensure accountability. 
Tisdell (pers.com., St. Lucia, 18 September 2001) voices related concerns in arguing that an over-
dependence on the non-government sector and concurrent de-emphasis on government involvement in 
development activities can create dispirited and unsustainably-serviced communities.   
 Development in the Solomon Islands is well described by ideas and concepts of social change 
that place the nation-state in a somewhat uncomfortable position between local and global forces. In this 
context, the nation state of the Solomon Islands is under considerable strain where it seeks to meet the 
challenges of contemporary statecraft. Given this, Christianity, kastom, and NGOs –are essential tools of 
exploration and analysis. Where employed, they may point to alternative paths to development. With this 
in mind, the paper now turns to discuss the broader situation in the Solomon Islands by way of 
preparation for an examination of the North New Georgia case study. 
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The Solomon Islands 
The story of the modern nation-state of the Solomon Islands begins with Pacific geography, colonialism, 
and the relatively recent construction of a new nation and state.  Where contemporary Solomons' political 
and economic life is indelibly marked by these factors, tremendous challenges to security, stability and 
growth are in evidence.  
 The Solomon Islands of today consists of six major islands – New Georgia, Choisel, Isabel, 
Guadalcanal, Malaita and Makira – along with a collection of more than 900 medium and small islands, 
islets and widely dispersed atolls (Kabutaulaka 1998, 7).3 Mostly volcanic in origin, these many islands 
are largely characterised by a rugged system of razorback ridges that rises abruptly from narrow coastal 
plains and reaches 1000-2000 metres in height. The climatic regime of this equatorial archipelago is 
marked by the southwest Pacific trade winds (blowing from the southeast from March until November, 
then reversing from December to April, which also brings the wet season). This regime ensures an 
average rainfall ranging between 2500 and 5000 millimetres and the likelihood of one or two cyclones 
per year. In this setting, variables including topography, soil type, rainfall, location and vegetative cover 
result in a great range of microsystems throughout the island chain. The Solomons occupies an area of 
over 777,000 square kilometres, 96% of which is sea (Bennett 1987, 1-4).  
 Prior to and during early contact (1568-1896) with European explorers, traders and whalers, and 
as is the case for many modern developing nation-states, the Solomons archipelago did not exist as a 
unified political community (Kabutaulaka 1998, 33). Instead, island life was organised around island and 
especially hamlet-based communities and incorporated intercommunity kinship ties (Bennett 1987, ch.1). 
These traditional patterns of existence were well suited to early barter and trade arrangements between 
islanders and Europeans, given that for many years colonial powers did not seek to establish more 
formal, binding and colonising ties.4 European interest in the Solomons was, however, consolidated in 
1896. At this time the British established a loose and somewhat unwilling control over the Solomons in 
declaring the archipelago a protectorate.5 This declaration was made in conjunction with a need to shore-
up this main supply of Melanesian labour for British plantations in Fiji and Queensland and to assuage 
anxieties within the Australian colonies regarding security vis-à-vis other European powers active in the 
region (Bennett 1987, ch.5); (Kabutaulaka 1998, 10).6  
 The British endeavour of turning the Solomon Islands and its people fully to the task of a 
protectorate was "slow and piecemeal" (Bennett 1987, 104). It was greatly augmented (though through 
no deliberate contrivance) by the unifying and pacifying activities of Christian missions – the influence 
of which into the present day can not be overemphasised (Bennett 1987, 104).7 Land alienation was 
central to the colonising process because self-sufficiency for the protectorate necessitated the economic 
presence and activities of European planters.8 As with Christianity, this has also had far reaching 
consequences. Finally, labour was essential, although not so easily obtained with demand quickly 
outstripping supply.9 The plantation nevertheless came to pervade the lives of Solomon Islanders to 
independence and beyond (Bennett 1987, 167). 
 The Great Depression, World War II, and the post-war years brought Solomon Islanders a 
domestic merchant class, hence local cash economy, and growing disillusionment with the colonial 
experience, hence increased political consciousness (Kabutaulaka 1998, 15). Despite such progress in the 
evolution of an indigenous and modern political economy, independence from Britain did not come until 
1978.10 In its worst moments the associated process of colonial disengagement was marked by weak 
planning for economic development; central government paternalism; and a frequent firming up of local 
political sentiment and will on key issues behind contending linguistic, regional and ethnic lines 
(Kabutaulaka 1998, 16). Based on these factors, Bennett (1987, 343) comments that, "With 
independence, the time of real nation building had only just begun."  
 A narrow resource base, remoteness and isolation, a limited domestic market, and ecological and 
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economic vulnerability have mitigated strongly against development in postcolonial Solomon Islands 
(Tisdell 2001b; World Bank 2000, 3). Economic progress is today harnessed almost exclusively to the 
exploitation of timber resources, fisheries, and most recently the development of gold reserves.11 Palm oil 
and kernel, copra and cocoa are also significant cash crops.12 This heavy reliance on natural resources 
and natural systems raises serious concerns regarding economic diversification and ecological 
management and sustainability. The experience to date indicates that the Solomons' economy is 
vulnerable to shocks in the world commodity markets – this was especially so during the Asian economic 
crisis in the late 1990s (Lilo 2000, 1). Further, long-term viability of natural assets in the Solomons, 
particularly tropical forests, is under considerable threat, as will be discussed below (Anon 1996; Collee 
1995; Danagro Advisery Company 1996; Mealy 1999; Narasia and Magick 1999). 
 Beyond strategic economic limitations, the Solomon Islands has experienced long-term and 
entrenched problems in the public sector. These have included difficulties with mismanagement, arbitrary 
decision-making, lack of transparency and accountability and aid dependency, amongst others (Larmour 
1997, 1998, 2000; Tisdell 2001b). This situation brought about severe problems in the mid 1990s during 
which time macro-economic imbalances and structural weaknesses precipitated a fiscal crisis, despite a 
favourable fiscal environment with a boom in the forestry sector during that same period (Asian 
Development Bank 2000b; Bosworth 1999). During this period there was a fall in real aid per capita, 
rising government debt and an inability of government to meet its debt obligations (Tisdell 2000, 4). On 
this, Lilo (2000, 1) is unequivocal in stating that "Severe fiscal imbalance was triggered by a consistently 
high budget deficit owing largely to poor policies and gross mismanagement."13 Corrective measures 
were brought about in 1997 with the election of the reform-oriented Ulufa'alu government.14 Tisdell 
(2001b) argues that despite improvements linked to associated structural adjustment reforms, these 
reforms also contributed significantly to a period of instability leading up to the coup of 2000. The 
trajectory of these reforms has been completely disrupted by the coup and its consequent fallout, as will 
be discussed below (Lilo 2000). 
 These problems of market and state are nowhere more in evidence than in the core economic 
sector of forestry. Forest resource development has been unsustainable throughout the Solomons for the 
last 20 years. Problems have included inadequate monitoring, weak regulatory arrangements and the 
corruption of regulatory institutions and arrangements through patronage, bribery and other means. This 
has resulted in serious economic loss, severe environmental despoliation and adverse social impact. At 
the same time, as Montgomery pointedly comments: "There is no other country in the world as dependent 
on log exports as the Solomon Islands, and more critically, there is no fallback position. Once the forests 
are gone there is no alternative" (1995, 75). 
 Forestry in the Solomon Islands underwent considerable expansion in the early 1980s in 
conjunction with an expanding world market and shrinking supply from established Southeast Asian 
sources. At this time, multinational companies with Asian links approached customary land owners 
offering terms that appeared generally attractive for economic recompense and development and 
specifically so where compared with those offered by more established colonial era companies (Bennett 
2000, 225). By the mid-1990s, these new arrangements ensured that about 80% of logging was occurring 
on customary land (Dauvergne 1998, 107).15 This situation has created a range of difficulties for resource 
and environmental management.16 Disputes over land and boundaries are now common throughout the 
Solomons, especially in areas where large-scale resource development is taking place (Kabutaulaka 1998, 
31). Problems in this area directly contributed to the build up of tensions and consequent coup of 2000, 
as discussed below.  
 As Bennett (2000) , Dauvergne (1998), Montgomery (1995)  and others establish, the Solomons 
government has been poorly equipped for the task of resource development and management.17 In a weak 
institutional environment, log production in the Solomon Islands increased from 380,000 cubic metres in 
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1991 to over 800,000 cubic metres in 1995-96 (Dauvergne 1998, 106). At 1996 rates, commercial forest 
resources were anticipated to reach depletion within thirteen years. Some analysts foresaw depletion 
occurring within as little as eight years (Montgomery 1995, 75). During the same 1991-1997 period, 
around SI$31 million in economic surplus was forgone because of log export duty remission and 
exemptions while SI$481 million was lost through the under-invoicing of log exports (Martin 2000, 5) . 
As Bennett (2000, 366) comments:  
The government has failed to maximise the market value of logs because of its tardiness since 
1980 with funding the timber and tax control capacities of the Forestry Division and the Ministry 
of Finance; millions of dollars of potential revenue have sailed out to sea in undeclared 
shipments, as mislabelled species or via the mechanisms of transfer-pricing. 
Along with these economic problems, the environmental and social impacts of unsustainable and poorly 
managed logging are also far reaching. Silvicultural practice has been poor. Soils, watersheds and sacred 
sites have been mismanaged. Re-afforestation and rehabilitation have been infrequently and inadequately 
undertaken. Wide ranging social conflicts have also emerged (Bennett 2000, ch.13). The momentum of 
these events has however been greatly reduced by the East Asian financial crisis of 1997, reform to the 
forestry sector introduced by the Ulufa'alu government, and thereafter the coup in 2000 (Dauvergne 
1998).18  
 In this context of a weak public sector, poor economic management and unsustainable resource 
development, human development in the Solomons is also sobering in its apparently limited progress. 
Indeed, worsening education and health indicators suggest that "de-development" is occurring (Tisdell 
2001b, 2). With a population of 442,000  the Solomons measures amongst the lowest in the Pacific 
region on the Human Development Index and maintains a world ranking of 147, placing it in parity with 
Guinea, Burundi, Senegal and Bangladesh (World Bank 2000, 13-14).19 Almost 70% of Solomon Islands 
adults are illiterate (World Bank 2000, 15). There are insufficient resources for universal primary/basic 
education and also for the extension of years of this level of education (Tisdell 2001b, 18). Secondary 
and tertiary education are extremely limited (Tisdell 2001b, 18). Health indicators remain amongst the 
worst in the Pacific region with endemic malaria and a variety of infectious and parasitic diseases 
affecting large though reducing numbers. There is however an increasing incidence of non-
communicable modern life-style diseases including heart disease, diabetes and cancer. Infant mortality is 
relatively high at 38 per 1000 births (Tisdell 2000, 18). One in five persons does not have access to 
health services (Tisdell 2000, 18).  
 The rate of population growth in the Solomons at over 3.5% is amongst the highest in the world 
(Tisdell 2001b, 13). Around 36% of people do not have access to safe drinking water (World Bank 2000, 
15). Distributive problems are considerable with 1% of households in the capital, Honiara, taking 50% of 
total earnings (World Bank 2000, 14). Youth unemployment is also high (well over 10%) (World Bank 
2000, 14) and 47% of the population is aged between 0-14 years (Kabutaulaka 1998, 16). Around 75% of 
the population is under 30 years of age (Liloqula and Pollard 2000). 
 Given these extensive difficulties throughout the nation-state, internal security has in recent years 
presented Solomons' governments with considerable challenges. This has been linked in the first instance 
to armed conflict in neighbouring Bougainville, the impact of which has spilled across the border.20 It has 
also been associated with what has been described as "ethnic tension".  These tensions have been focused 
on Guadalcanal and particularly in the capital, Honiara. They are linked to deeply held grievances 
relating to land tenure that have been exacerbated by mass migrations onto Guadalcanal from other 
islands, especially Malaita. These migrations have in turn resulted in increasing social pressures and 
economic competition (Asian Development Bank 2000a, 2); (Liloqula and Pollard 2000);  (Naitoro 
2000); (Tuhanuku 2000, iii).21 Where successive governments failed to address these tensions, a coup, 
spearheaded by Malaitan-aligned forces, resulted on 5 June 2000.22 In accordance with the demands of 
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coup leaders, the incumbent prime minister resigned and a difficult period of negotiation for a new 
administration, a peace agreement, and an apparent political resolution followed.23  
 The political, social and economic disruption brought about by this coup has been considerable. 
The process of macro-economic reform commenced by the ousted administration has been brought to an 
end. Episodes of violence remain uncontrolled and many people have fled the capital for the outer 
provinces.24 Most significant enterprises have scaled down if not halted operations, levels of foreign 
investment have fallen dramatically, and the delivery of aid has been interrupted.25 The costs of 
rebuilding are estimated to be considerable and will require long-term investments.26 
In the face of many economic, social and political difficulties and related state inadequacy, 
broader Solomon Islands society is proving to be especially resilient and important in the creation and 
maintenance of alternative pathways to development action. Christian churches are perhaps the most 
influential institution in Solomon Islands life with 95% of the population belonging to a church. 
Followings of the United Church (Methodist), Seventh Day Adventist Church, South Seas Evangelical 
Church, the Catholic Church, and the Anglican Church are spread throughout the archipelago (Weir 
2000, 49). At times this diversity has resulted in considerable interdenominational rivalry but in recent 
years such tensions have been put largely (though not conclusively) to rest through the activities of the 
umbrella organisation, Solomon Islands Christian Association (Dinnen pers.com. 13 December 2001; 
Weir 2000, 49).27  Douglas argues that the Christian churches have “been the major avenue for modernity 
for 150 years in some areas” of Solomon Islands (Douglas, pers.com, Canberra, 12 December 2001). 
Given negative impacts on traditional beliefs and practices, the churches have thus pioneered the 
provision of education, health and other community projects and services – for example, community-
based timber-harvesting arrangements. The churches are also influential in shaping perceptions and 
understandings of development, thereby establishing themselves as major stakeholders in the 
development process (Kabutaulaka 1998, 46).28 For Kabutaulaka (1998, 48) "the church has become so 
powerful that development agencies and the state cannot afford to ignore this institution as an important 
vehicle for implementing development programmes".  
NGOs provide a second alternative avenue for the pursuit of development (Roughan 1997). 
Bennett suggests that: "Excluding the churches, the strongest empowering force in the rural Solomons is 
the NGOs. As with the churches, NGOs are a diverse group and competition and friction frequently arise 
among various parties (Dinnen pers.com. 13 December 2001). This is to some extent managed through 
the umbrella organisation Development Services Exchange (Australian Council for Overseas Aid 2000, 
35-36). Unlike most of their Northern counterparts, NGOs in the Solomons often link human rights and 
development with environmental issues" (2000, 269). This is especially apparent in issue areas concerned 
with logging where Bennett (2000, 274) finds considerable political lobbying, agitation and even 
subversion to be in evidence. Likewise, women's groups (church-based and non-aligned) are gaining 
increasingly prominent profiles in Solomon Islands "civil society" (recently so-called by Solomon 
Islanders (Douglas, pers.com, Canberra, 12 December 2001)). The activities of these groups are 
frequently linked to conflict resolution and peace-brokering in the face of periodic civil unrest (Douglas 
2000a, 12); (Douglas 2000c). Women's groups are also involved in health, education and employment-
generation activities (Australian Council for Overseas Aid 2000, 7). According to the Australian Council 
for Overseas Aid (2000, 7), "Many women's groups have positive proposals for such ventures and the 
capacity to harness the energies of their communities." Given the strength of activity of NGOs in the 
Solomon Islands, it can be argued that as with the Christian churches at the turn of the previous century, 
Solomon Islanders are now in the process of selecting those aspects of NGOs best suited to Melanesian 
life in the twenty first century (Bennett 2000, 274). 
 Kastom is another vital, robust and uniquely complex resource in contemporary Solomon's 
development.29 For Douglas, indigenous values in Melanesia are “usually flexible and open to new things 
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and ideas” (pers.com, Canberra, 12 December 2001). Kabutaulaka (1998, 18) comments that "cultural 
traditions and introduced ways of life continuously interact and impact on one another. Social 
transformation and the making and implementation of development policies are influenced greatly by 
both ways of life." Traditional styles of leadership and forms of power relations must co-exist with a 
Westminster parliamentary system. Customary land title must sit along side large-scale state efforts to 
mobilise resources.  
 As the many difficulties now facing Solomon Islands and the events of the 2000 coup and its 
aftermath indicate, the archipelago has come under considerable and increasing strain in recent years. In 
this, the nation-state has offered inconsistent and incomplete political and economic stability and 
security. At the same time, the Christian Churches, kastom, and NGOs afford long established alternative 
pathways to community development and social change .This will now be considered within the context 
of the North New Georgia case study.     
The North New Georgia Sustainable Social Forestry and Rural Development Project 
Context and Foundations 
The Western Province of the Solomon Islands within which the island of New Georgia lies has long been 
recognised for a sense of distinctiveness and a spirit of autonomy vis-a-vis the Solomon Islands (Moore, 
pers.com., St. Lucia, 30 May, 2001; Otter, pers.com. St. Lucia, 2 May, 2001).30 This distinctiveness has 
occasionally spilled over into secessionist rhetoric.31 It has also placed the Western Province in a position 
of some relative economic advantage.32 With particular reference to forest resources, Western Province 
has historically contained 75% of Solomon Islands' "finest forests" (Bennett 2000, 135). By the mid 
1990s, 30% of loggable timber in this region had been extracted (Bennett 2000, 280). At this time, this 
amounted to 76% of the country's total round log export revenue (Bennett 2000, 280). As with the rest of 
the Solomons, such rates of extraction rapidly exceeded sustainable levels and the environmental and 
social impacts of poor logging practice – typically clear-fell (Dart pers.com., St. Lucia, 2 May 2001)– 
were painfully evident (Bennett 2000, 282).33  
 Commercial scale logging began in earnest in North New Georgia in the 1970s.  This was 
undertaken by UK-based Lever Pacific Timbers – operating elsewhere in the Solomons since 1901 
(Bennett 1987, 128). In the 1970s, Lever's was central to the economy of Western Province with 40% of 
the workforce employed by the company. Furthermore, 17% of the nation's foreign exchange earnings 
flowed from Lever's activities (Bennett 1987, 218). Lever's particular efforts in New Georgia were, 
however, fraught with difficulty. Negotiations begun in the 1960s with the Solomon Islands government 
over an option to work the area were repeatedly disrupted through to the mid-1980s. This disruption 
turned on disagreements among customary landowners who disputed issues of leadership and 
representation as linked to questions of land tenure and timber rights. There were also concerns about 
Lever's debatable record in social and environmental impact management on Kolumbangara (Bennett 
2000, 218). These tensions spilled over into judicial and legislative arenas and despite due process 
remained unresolved.34 Matters came to a head in the early 1980s when Levers refused to enter into 
direct negotiation with aggrieved landholders (Bennett 2000, 220). With frustrations for key players high, 
fertile ground existed for new players to enter the ring. When the Asian logging competitor Golden 
Spring International demonstrated an apparently greater understanding of local leadership and social 
relationships, change was immanent.35  
 For New Georgians, this culmination of events ensured that local people were for the first time in 
40 years in control of the allocation of forest resources (Bennett 2000, 225). Indeed, it appears likely that 
local resistance to and disruption of due process vis-a-vis logging at every level were aimed at loosening 
the grip of central government and Levers on North New Georgian affairs. Unfortunately, these 
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disruptions mitigated strongly against any potential investment in re-afforestation – even from aid 
agencies (Bennett 2000, 246). At the same time, Golden Springs International was proving to have 
limited concern for sustainable logging practices. Thus, although logging continued, the task of re-
afforestation lay idle to the mid 1990s. Therein lay the early groundwork for the North New Georgia 
Sustainable Social Forestry and Rural Development Project. 
 Early interest in some concrete form of re-afforestation and sustainable forestry for North New 
Georgia arose out of this set of conditions. It was spearheaded by a loose network of individuals and 
groups linked to the community consultation activities of Golden Spring International (Dart, pers.com., 
St. Lucia, 2 May 2001).36 In this context, key actors included the Rev. Ikani Rove, the Christian 
Fellowship Church (CFC), Greg Young and Grant Doran. The Rev. Ikani Rove was an influential and 
charismatic leader in the CFC and spokesperson for the local community. For the duration of project 
activity, Rove maintained a key visionary and leadership role and all key decision making flowed from 
and/or was finalised (in the specific case of technical advice, for example) by him (Young pers.com., St. 
Lucia, 6 September 2001). The CFC had for many years argued broadly for intergenerational equity and 
sustainability in New Georgia vis-à-vis logging.37 Greg Young had worked for some time in mineral 
exploration in North New Georgia and was consequently well known and "accepted" by local community 
leaders. Grant Doran, an accountant, was introduced to community leaders by Greg Young (Young 
pers.com., St. Lucia, 6 September 2001). Discussions among these individuals allowed for an exploration 
of Rev. Ikani Rove's vision for sustainable forestry in New Georgia. This emerging vision was centred on 
twin concerns for medium to long-term income generation and the creation of local employment 
opportunities for local youth. It was based upon the perception of the need for direct technical assistance 
transfer in order to resolve specific scientific and technical re-afforestation problems (Davie and Dart 
2000).   
 The area encompassed by the envisioned project covered around 40,000 ha. This area fell within 
the customary land areas of Ngrassi, Dukerana and Lunga wherein logging was completed, commenced, 
and not yet commenced, respectively. Dukerana and Lunga lay within the northern catchments of the 
Morovo Lagoon. Land use therein would affect this multiple use area (Davie and Dart 2000, 13).38 With 
this vision for inter-generational equity emerging, the CFC provided seed funding of $AU100,000 in 
support of an initial community request for a commercial-scale tree nursery (Davie and Dart 2000, 13). . 
Grant Doran and Greg Young established technical support through Dr Peter Dart from the University of 
Queensland  (Dart, pers.com., St. Lucia, 2 May 2001). Project activities commenced officially in October 
1999.  
Project Activities 
Specific project activities involved the establishment of a commercial-scale tree nursery. The design and 
operation of this nursery was based in part on the experiences of the neighbouring Kolumbangara 
plantations.39 Basic principles included a capacity to operate in a straightforward manner while allowing 
for a reasonable level of expansion and sophistication  (Dart, pers.com., St. Lucia, 2 May 2001).40 With 
modest and sound beginnings, this infrastructure was designed to expand to a capacity of one million 
trees per year. This equated into approximately 1000ha of planting per year  (Dart, pers.com., St. Lucia, 2 
May 2001). With an emphasis on industrial plantation timbers and production, trial species included 
gmelina, eucalypts and acacias.41 Native species were not placed under consideration at this early stage  
(Dart, pers.com., St. Lucia, 2 May 2001). Closed seed lot material was initially sought from 
Kolumbangara plantations. Germplasm material was developed from this. Thereafter, rammet garden 
trees were established and maintained. Cuttings were taken from these trees and these were vegetatively 
propagated in the nursery.42 
 In the post 2000 coup environment, the field project remained in place. Indeed, it was located 
 
11 
well beyond physical proximity to areas of instability within the Solomons. Australian-based technical 
advisers were however unable to visit the site as a result of security concerns in Honiara or establish any 
communications with locals – there were no communications technologies in or near the relevant 
community. Despite this disruption, the project attracted the attention and praise of Solomon Islands 
provincial political leaders working towards reconstruction in the coup's aftermath. Commenting through 
the auspices of the UNDP, these leaders were promoting new models for rural development throughout 
Western Province as exemplified by the activities of the North New Georgia project (Pestelos 2001).43 
Institutional Matters 
The second area of project activity in North New Georgia related to institutional matters. This was 
spearheaded by Greg Young and Grant Doran and resulted in the foundation of the Rural Development 
Trust Board (RDTB). The RDTB was established in order to implement and undertake the long-term 
management of this aspect of the project. The RDTB's first task was to manage the specific relationship 
growing between the local community and its partners in development. As was stated by the RDTB: 
"institutional parties and rural communities required an entity with which they could deal as a neutral 
body independent from internal and external influences" (Rural Development Trust Board 1999, 2). In 
this sense, Young (pers.com., St. Lucia, 6 September 2001) described the RDTB as a "bridging 
instrument" able to include the appropriate qualities of both the developing and developed world. The 
key concerns of the RDTB were thus transparency, indigenous representation, and inclusiveness (Young 
pers.com., St. Lucia, 6 September 2001). 
 Transparency was ensured through the RDTB's institutional arrangements wherein the Trust was 
a charitable trust established under Solomon Island law. It was also a Unit Trust of the Pacific 
Development Fund (PDF), a not-for-profit Australian company established by RDTB members to act as 
trustee (Davie, Dart, and Young 2000); (Rural Development Trust Board 1999, 2).  This arrangement 
ensured that the RDTB was subject to auditing and scrutiny by Australian-based and internationally-
recognised financial and legal firms, KPMG Chartered Accountants and Deacons, Graham and James 
Lawyers.  
 Indigenous and developing world representation was assumed and assured from the outset where 
the RDTB arose out of a consultative process involving North New Georgia community leaders, 
Solomon Island politicians and public servants along with Australian scientific and other advisers (Davie, 
Dart, and Young 2000, 8). To date, an unofficial 2/3 "Melanesian" majority has been maintained over 
board membership (Young pers.com., St. Lucia, 6 September 2001). Both the RDTB and the PDF had 
strong links with the Solomon Islands Government and were endorsed by the then Solomon Islands 
prime minister, Ulufa'alu.  
 The assurance of inclusiveness was of some concern in the establishment of the RDTB. Here 
inclusiveness refers to the inclusion of all relevant stakeholders with regards to a given RDTB issue area 
(Young pers.com., St. Lucia, 6 September 2001). Potential stakeholders included: the North New 
Georgia community, provincial and national Solomon Islands governments, rural development, social 
and environmental advocacy NGOs, logging companies, mining companies, intergovernmental 
organisations, the University of Queensland, and the Queensland State Government. Thus, as one of its 
key guiding principles the RDTB stated: "We seek to involve a broad range of philosophical positions in 
our decision making mechanisms by inviting participation from diverse fields and activity. This involves 
public, private, civil society participants from the local, national, regional and international levels" (Rural 
Development Trust Board 1999, 1). 
 The mission statement of the RDTB was as follows: "Our Mission is to facilitate the sustainable 
development of natural resources in rural areas through a quest for sustainable human development that 
holds the peace and spiritual wellbeing of the family and wider community as the most valuable 
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resources of all" (Rural Development Trust Board 1999, 1). The RDTB aimed to be organisationally self-
sustaining (including operational costs) (Rural Development Trust Board 1999, 1). Founders and 
members took considerable pride in the comparatively unique principles, scope and structure of the Trust 
where the more typical business of development in Melanesia was concerned (Young pers.com., St. 
Lucia, 6 September 2001)  
 With the RDTB in place, project partners sought to extend the scope and reach of this new 
NGO's financial and management mechanisms. Dialogue was undertaken with members of parliament in 
the Solomon Islands with a view to establishing through parliament a unique arrangement vis-à-vis the 
RDTB and intergovernmental agencies. This arrangement would support agreements made between the 
RDTB and funding organisations (ADB, World Bank, AusAID, etc.) without the direct involvement of 
the Solomon Islands government  (Dart, pers.com., St. Lucia, 28 June 2001). Although initial responses 
to this proposal were favourable, the events surrounding the coup disrupted any further progress on this 
matter. 
 Under these auspices of the institutional support of the thus configured RDTB, the North New 
Georgia Sustainable Social Forestry and Rural Development Project's objectives were considered to be as 
follows:  
On the customary land areas identified as Ngrassi, Dukerna and Lunga, to formulate a model of 
rural community development which will optimise the land and financial resources made 
available by the on-going logging of primary forest in the project area, while assisting in the 
control of ensuing environmental damage (Davie and Dart 2000, 5). 
With the aid of technical advice, Ikani Rove's vision for sustainable forestry thus expanded into a broad 
and ambitious programme for rural community development. Therein, key project components included: 
infrastructure, land resource evaluation and planning, forestry, and agriculture land use options (Davie 
and Dart 2000, 5-10).  
 With institutional arrangements in place and project concepts under development, project 
partners expanded in January 2000 to include the University of Queensland, the Queensland 
Government, and the Solomons Island Government.44 As discussions among these partners and the 
RDTB gained momentum during mid-2000, these discussions [???what?] were also of considerable 
moment: on 5 July 2000, as interested parties in Brisbane moved to consolidate their commitment to the 
project, the Malaita Eagle Force wrested control of Honiara from the democratically-elected government 
of Prime Minister Ulufa'alu. Thereafter, all institutional developments within Australia came to an 
immediate halt with no further developments occurring, pending the Solomon Islands' general election in 
late 2001. This disruption was a direct consequence of continuing uncertainty within the assistance 
community based on concerns held for stability and security in the broader Solomons. 
Discussion  
The North New Georgia re-afforestation project sits amidst a turning point in Melanesian history that is 
marked by globalisation, troubled states, and a raft of complex political and economic difficulties. In this 
context, the story of the project is an interesting one, the broad themes of which can be explored through 
the concept of the Melanesian way, and also the role and influence of Christian churches, kastom, and 
NGOs in Melanesian society. This story points to political and economic development activity taking 
place outside more typical state-based channels for such action. It indicates that where states are weak, 
broader society can be strong and can in consequence marshal action and resources towards community 
development.  
 The North New Georgia project is noteworthy in the first instance because the relevant local 
community initiated it. The project's activities were also established on community-derived seed funding. 
From the outset, the local community participated in and owned (including financially) the re-
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afforestation scheme. As is quite usual in Melanesia, a Christian church – the CFC– lay at the heart of 
these matters. The CFC is an independent indigenous church, and this heightens the impression of 
indigenous agency and ownership. With the presence and contribution of the CFC also came leadership 
in local forms in the person of the Rev. Ikani Rove,  the community’s spiritual leader. Institutional 
arrangements established through the NGO, the RDTB, ensured transparency and accountability. These 
arrangements also allowed for a unique positioning of the project with regard to government. This 
brought about a relationship that supported external relations between local and extra-national project 
stakeholders in the absence of (though with the support of) Solomon Islands government participation.  
The project's substantive achievements demonstrated that work in the field initiated by the local 
community and assisted through external technical advice was viable as were the unique institutional 
arrangements designed to support this. To date, instability and uncertainty associated with the 2000 coup 
has ensured that the next phase of project activity remains largely in abeyance. Given this, an ongoing 
commitment to the project has continued and awaits the resolution of the Solomon Islands’ political 
problems.  
 For the Solomon Islands, the North New Georgia project is significant to the extent that it points 
to possibilities for new community-based approaches to the development and management of forest 
resources – the nation's core economic sector. These approaches are potentially more compatible with 
customary land ownership than their antecedents. This is a significant matter where it is remembered that 
more than 80% of forestry activity occurs on customary land and that unresolved conflicts vis-à-vis 
customary land are central to political tensions throughout the Solomons. The North New Georgia project 
also offers new approaches for sustainable resource development. With large tracts of the North New 
Georgia region (indeed, much of the Solomons) already clear-felled and the task of re-afforestation long 
eluding concerned parties, this is an important development. Where forests and their resources are central 
to local community life and also a solitary avenue to the cash economy, the importance of sustainability 
can not be over-emphasised. The implications for local ecology and biodiversity in the long-term absence 
of re-afforestation are obvious: as is the denial of human potential where such a situation persists. 
Finally, the North New Georgia project offers important alternative arrangements for the management of 
matters linked to transparency and accountability. This has been a longstanding problem in the forestry 
sector and also in the disbursal of development assistance finance throughout the Solomons. In 
structuring community development activities transparently and accountably, problems of 
mismanagement are minimised while opportunities for participation in mainstream economic life are 
maximised.  
 In the final analysis, much of the observable achievement attributable to the North New Georgia 
project remains in the realm of potential. The establishment and operation of a tree nursery is an 
important practical development but the broader technical and institutional dimensions of the project are 
largely untested where the next phase of activities are held in abeyance. And despite very deliberate 
efforts to construct the project outside the ambit of national politics, the project and hence its 
contributions to community development have been greatly disrupted by the 2000 coup and its fallout. 
Where these distracting broader events have had a large impact on the project and its activities, ways in 
which the re-afforestation scheme will sit with and feed into local (and also provincial, national and 
international) power relations have not been adequately unravelled. Associated matters are likely to 
include: disputes within and between customary land owner groups; complexifying linkages into local 
political ambitions and political structures; contentions concerned with distribution, equity and 
inclusiveness; and managing appropriate association with formal and informal community, state, donor, 
technician, NGO, and corporate practice and institutions.  
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Conclusion 
The paper returns now to its key theoretical interests: an exploration of the roles of state and society in 
Melanesian life and an exposition of the place of globalisation in the region. As the North New Georgia 
case study demonstrates, where the state is inadequately undertaking the task of development, other areas 
in society are able to move some way towards filling the gap. This in itself is not unusual and has been 
widely observed and frequently advocated throughout the developing world. What is unusual in the case 
of North New Georgia is the demonstration of ways in which the organisation of globally-orientated 
economic potential may soon be effectively located at the community level for the purposes of 
community development and largely without state involvement.  
 The North New Georgia case study thus described points to new dimensions emerging in the 
exercise of what might be described as the Melanesian way  – a concept in itself that remains in many 
ways an undefined rhetorical slogan. Putting this contested slogan to one side, it is clear that the nation-
state of the Solomon Islands is indisputably weak and  local church, kastom, and NGO activity and 
organisation have longstanding importance in the pursuit of community development and social change. 
With this has also come a new outlook towards the global and away from the national. The case study 
considered in this paper provides interesting insights into Melanesian political and economic life and new 
ways in which it may soon extend from local communities through to international and perhaps 
globalising processes and structures.  In this, it is of course too early in the project's life – especially 
given its disruption – for definitive statements regarding substantive activities, institutions and their 
outcomes. At the very least however, the project points to the purposeful pursuit of new arrangements for 
development by a sub-nationally located community and the capacity of the international development 
assistance community to accommodate this.  
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Notes 
1 See Firth (2000b, 2000b) and Fry (2000) for an outline of ways in which globalisation is affecting life 
in the South Pacific. 
2 Douglas (2000a, 2000c), Liloqula and Pollard (2000) write on the activities of women's NGOs in 
Melanesia. 
3 Of the total number of 922 islands, only 347 are currently inhabited (Kabutaulaka 1998, 7). 
4 Such relations introduced western goods, particularly iron tools, into the Solomons for the first time. 
Food, water, crafts and, most importantly, labour and sexual favours were exchanged for these highly 
prized goods (Bennett 1987, chs. 1-4). 
5 According to Bennett (1987, 103), the British Treasury did not wish to finance a new dependency at 
this time. The British took on the Solomons on the proviso that the colony pay for its own administration. 
6 During this period Germany annexed New Guinea and North Solomons (Kabutaulaka 1998, 10). 
7 Bennett (1987, 104) finds that it was "slow, because of the nature of Solomon Island societies and the 
limited resources of the government; piecemeal, because the government aimed to make the Europeans 
and their property secure rather than the Islanders and their land". 
8 The British presence brought about considerable disruption to traditional power relations and in 
consequence to traditional systems of land ownership. Bennett (1987, 115-116) argues that the British 
presence closed virtually all traditional means to acquiring and maintaining power. In the new colonial 
order, power could be expressed only through participation in the emerging capitalist system: hence, in 
obtaining and redistributing wealth via the sale of labour, products, and land.  
9 Maltreatment including routine physical violence were the order of the day on most plantations 
(Bennett 1987, 154-155). 
10 Although Britain was ultimately eager to divest itself of its colonial possession, the British maintained 
for many years that Solomon Islands did not possess the institutional capacity for independence (Bennett 
1987, ch. 14).  
11 In 1996, timber accounted for 50% of export earnings (Kabutaulaka 1998, 7). 
12 Palm oil and kernel made up 12.6 of export earnings in 1996. Significant oil palm and cocoa 
plantations are located on Guadalcanal. Large scale commercial agriculture is limited by physical and 
natural systems – although problems here have as much to do with unresolved questions of land 
ownership (Kabutaulaka 1998, 7-8). 
13 Lilo (2000, 1-2) outlines major problem areas in detail. These include: poor financial recording and 
control; unaudited accounts back to 1984 in 1998; failure to recognise the severity of expenditure over-
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run; poor debt management; weak regulation (tax) of logging and manufacturing sectors; poor 
management of revenue-generating departments in public sector; poor use of Central Bank facilities; and 
poor performance of state-owned enterprises. 
14  Larmour (2000) provides an interesting outline of accountability reforms. 
15 The great hope for Melanesians that came with these new companies was the provision of roads, 
bridges, schools, and clinics. 
16 See Kabutaulaka (1998, 30-31) for an outline of traditional land tenure arrangements and associated 
problems.  
17 See Bennett (2000, 1) for a detailed account of the history of forestry in Solomon Islands (1800-1997) 
with particular reference to: "the natural environment of the past, particularly the forest environment; the 
interaction between the human productive technology and that environment; and human perceptions and 
beliefs about forest use over time." In this, Bennett argues that inconsistencies and conflicts between 
central and provincial jurisdictions have allowed persistent problems to emerge. Dauvergne (1998, 107) 
argues that serious flaws existed for many years in the structure and content of forest legislation and 
policies designed to capture timber rents. Montgomery (1995, 76) finds that governments are unable to 
enforce policy and manage the inter-related tasks of resource development and environmental 
management. Montgomery also finds that management units are under-resourced and under-staffed with 
deficits in adequate training. 
18 Downturns in demand for timber in major Asian markets have naturally resulted in a slowing of 
production with some foreign companies suspending operations (Dauvergne 1998) p.106. 
19 Adult literacy is 30.3%, population growth is 3.3%, and life expectancy is 64 years (World Bank 2000, 
13). 
20 Bougainville is in close geographic proximity to the Western Solomons and there are strong kinship 
ties between the respective populations. The leader of resistance in Bougainville was also for some time 
officially based in Honiara (Sore 2000, 4).  
21 Tuhanuku (2000, iii) argues that tension surrounds the large-scale and long-term migration of 
Malaitans (in particular, although migrants from all provinces are involved) as labourers to Guadalcanal 
and their consequent gaining of access to the traditional lands of the Guadalcanal people through formal, 
informal, legal and sometimes illegal means. Concerns emerged regarding the adequate administration of 
transient, migrating and sometimes squatting populations around the capital and particularly where law 
and order and rentals were concerned. In this connection, Naitoro (2000) argues that the Guadalcanal 
people have suffered more impositions than most in the processes of colonisation and decolonisation due 
to their land possessing higher agricultural and rental values. Liloqula and Pollard (2000, 3) argue that 
legitimate concerns about the management of transmigration were compounded by some seeking to settle 
old grievances or simply seek finance. Related tensions increased at the end of 1998 when a group of 
young armed men known as the Guadalcanal Revolution Army (GRA) (now the Isatabu Freedom 
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Movement [IFM]) started the forced repatriation of settlers, especially Malaitans. The GRA/IFM also 
demanded compensation from the government for wrongs allegedly committed by Malaitans. In response 
to these tensions, the government began official repatriation of Malaitans. For their part, the Malaitans 
sought compensation. When the government appeared slow in acknowledging these demands a militant 
response in the guise of the Malaitan Eagle Force emerged.  
22 Events at this time were brought to a head when it became clear that internal security forces held 
greater loyalty for their island origins – Malaitan or Guadalcanal – than their employer, the government 
(Tuhanuku 2000, iii.  
23 Prime minister Ulufa'alu bowed to the demands of rebel spokesperson Andrew Nori and tendered his 
resignation amidst great controversy on 13 June 2000 (Sore 2000; Tuhanuku 2000, iii). Nori's positioning 
in these events has been described as political opportunism (Moore, pers.com., 30 May 2001; Otter, 
pers.com., 2 May3 2001).  
24 It is estimated that more than 30,000 people have fled Honiara (Asian Development Bank 2000a, 1). 
25 Liloqula and Pollard (2000) suggest that the economy had collapsed within a week of the coup. 
Tensions have led to the closure of operations at Gold Ridge Mining Ltd, Solomon Islands Plantations 
Ltd, Solbrew Company Ltd and Solomon Tobacco Ltd. The public sector has also been severely cut back 
(Sore 2000). Around 8000 people (or 20% of the formal sector workforce) have been placed in unpaid 
indefinite leave (Asian Development Bank 2000a, 1-3).  Most expatriates were evacuated, cutting short 
the activities of joint ventures and volunteer operations (Sore 2000). The delivery of assistance finance 
was impossible (Asian Development Bank 2000b). As a result, the economy contracted by around 14%, 
exports declined by 29% and imports declined by 15% (Asian Development Bank 2000b). 
26 There has been $US30-35 million worth of damage done to infrastructure including water supply and 
sanitation, roads, bridges, public offices, etc. In the short term, the Solomons government does not have 
funds to commence the process of rebuilding (Asian Development Bank 2000a, 1-3). 
27 The exception here would be in the case of the particular tensions experienced between Malaita and 
Guadalcanal (Dinnen pers.com. 13 December 2001). 
28 Kabutaulaka (1998, 46) comments that the Christian denominations have portrayed development in 
terms of Westernisation and industrialisation, hence a Christianised progression. 
29 See Kabutaulaka (1998, 17-33) for a detailed account of kastom, kinship groups, clans, wantoks and 
big-man politics. Sporting clubs, professional associations, women's organisations, media and unions are 
other important constituents in civil society.  
30 According to Bennett (1987, 327), the strong sense of identity and apartness held by those of the 
Western Province is based on: "Their blackness, their Roviana lingua franca, their Christian religious 
affiliations, their beautiful and influential women, and their pride in being smallholder producers rather 
than migrant labourers".  
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31 Independence brought some gestures at secession with it as did the 2000 coup (Bennett 1987, 328).  
32 Those of the west have long been involved in diverse commercial opportunities. They have enjoyed 
greater social cohesion as a direct result of the presence of Christian missionaries who championed many 
of the secular interests of their followers. For this reason, they have also enjoyed higher educational 
outcomes (Bennett 1987, 241-242). 
33 With this in turn came a wave of local resistance to the presence and activities of logging 
concessionaires, as will now be discussed (Bennett 2000, 284-288). 
34 During this period parliament introduced legislation that separated timber rights from land tenure. This 
legislation failed (Bennett 1987, 224).  
35 Golden Springs Ltd was incorporated in the United States with its principle, Kang Wibosono, based in 
Indonesia. The corporation replaced Levers Pacific Timbers in the late 1980s on North New Georgia. 
Where Golden Springs Ltd demonstrated a greater understanding of local leadership and social 
relationships (and, ultimately a similar approach to environmental management) this new contender won 
out. (Bennett 2000, 247-8). With events stacked against Levers, the company was forced to withdraw 
from New Georgia in 1986 (Bennett 2000, 245-8). 
36 From the outset, personal relationship and leadership supplied through key individuals have been a 
central element in the progress of the North New Georgia project. 
37 The CFC is an indigenous church and was established in New Georgia more than 50 years ago. It has a 
large following throughout the Solomons and particularly in North New Georgia. The church is strongly 
involved in community development and pastoral care. In this connection, the CFC has been involved in 
land allocation decisions and has brokered related collective agreements (Dart 2000). 
38 See Baird (2001) and Mealey (1999) for environmental problems in the Morovo lagoon area resulting 
from clear fell logging.  
39 The British company Levers Pacific Timbers had managed timber operations on Kolumbagara 
throughout the twentieth century.  
40 An automatic watering system supplied by a local creek was, for example, essential. 
41 Gmelina arborea, Eucalyptus deglupta and Eucalyptus teretioruis, Acacia margium. 
42 This procedure requires rooting material, hormones, and a misting system (Dart 2001a).  
43 Warren Paia, chairperson of the western province economic task force, praised the North New Georgia 
project for its unique approach to a community initiative linked to mainstream economic life. He also 
commented that projects such as that in North New Georgia where local communities engage in projects 
on their own rather than waiting for government assistance is especially significant (Pestelos 2001). 
44 In the case of the University of Queensland, the School of Land and Food Science in the Faculty of 
Natural Resources, Agriculture and Veterinary Science spearheaded the project while all other 
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Departments (Arts; Biological and Chemical Sciences; Business, Economics and Law; Engineering, 
Physical Sciences and Architecture; Health Sciences; Institute for Continuing and TESOL Education; and 
Social and Behavioural Science) expressed interest in contributing to the partnership. Where the 
Queensland Government was concerned, the Department of Natural Resources, the Queensland Forestry 
Research Institute, and the Department of Primary Industries were involved.   
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